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In the imagination of China’s leaders, Singapore evokesan idyllic world. The city-state is opulent. It ceaselesslyinvents new strategies to re-launch economic growth, a
rarity among developed countries. Social order reigns. The
future looks bright for the People’s Action Party (PAP),
which has ruled Singapore since its independence in 1965;
there appears to be no credible threat to its monopoly on
power. Often presenting the Chineseness of mainland
China as a factor rendering it impervious to comparison with
other states, the Communist Party of China prefers to look
within the Chinese world, affecting open contempt for the
alleged failings and frustrations of Taiwan’s democracy and
showing a definite interest in the Singaporean way of gover-
nance.
A study group of the Central Party School (1) reporting its
findings on a trip to Singapore can scarcely contain its admi-
ration for the city-state. From its observations, the study
group draws two implied recommendations for the reform of
politics in China: electoral procedures without democracy
can boost political stability if the system of parties is geared
toward it; and the fight against corruption can be effective
without the checks provided by the ballot box and freedom
of the press in the West. 
According to the Party school, Singaporeans have clearly
grasped that Western-style multiparty democracy with a
revolving door to power contributes to instability and is thus
incompatible with “national characteristics” (guoqing). The
city-state has therefore created a system in which one party
exercises power over the long term, while allowing the coex-
istence of other parties. This helps avoid the perceived
Western phenomenon of an ascent to power by opportunists
or extremists favouring runaway social welfare provisions.
This system is already ostensibly applied in China, where
eight smaller democratic parties coexist around the
Communist Party. (2) In theory the satellites play a central
role in the regime’s definition of itself as a system of demo-
cratic centralism (minzhu jizhongzhi). In reality, they act as
a smokescreen with little effect on either the CPC’s image
or the formulation of its public policies. 
In this respect, Singapore’s party system is more sophisticat-
ed and effective, (3) Mainly because regular elections confirm
the ruling party’s grip on power and raise its legitimacy. Of
course, the Central Party School report does not bother
with noting the methods used by the Singapore government
to retain power, which makes the regime an example of
“illiberal democracy.” (4) Rather, it states that the PAP
makes major use of state resources to consolidate its power.
But that is not the key; more noteworthy for the Chinese
delegation was the process of reassurance, which lent ration-
ality and legitimacy to the ruling party.
The Central Party School sees in the Singaporean system
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which the small parties exercise a counterweight role with-
out threatening the dominant party. The small Singaporean
parties, in the Chinese delegation’s view, help satisfy the
people’s desire to wield some checks over the exercise of
power by the majority party by creating a channel for
expressing dissatisfaction towards the majority party and
thus defusing anger towards it. At the end of the day, the
system acts to restrain the PAP’s actions and obliges it to act
prudently and respect people’s interests, and in return, the
PAP’s stranglehold on power is strengthened. Such argu-
mentation indicates that the Chinese delegation tends to
view procedural democracy as not only guaranteeing the
legitimacy of the dominant party, but also facilitating long-
term stability in the balance of power within the political sys-
tem while exerting pressure to ensure that the majority party
never forgets to put itself at the service of the nation’s pros-
perity.
In fact, the CPC’s reform options are not limited to either
Western-style democracy or incremental implantation of
more democratic procedures within the party. The party
school’s study group notes that erroneous theoretical notions
have to be shed: electoral procedures don’t mean democra-
cy, and a multiparty system doesn’t necessarily imply shifts
in power. Rather, in the view of the study group, China has
already partially implemented a system in which one party
exercises monopoly power over the long term with many par-
ties coexisting (as in Singapore), but the system needs to be
consolidated so as to create, as Singapore has done, the ver-
itable government of elites (jingying zhiguo zhidu) that Plato
set out in his Republic. 
Another specificity of the Singaporean system that the party
school study group took to heart was the resolution of the
problem of official corruption without recourse to either
democracy (with the risk of loss of power for a corrupt
party) or to a press that goes to town with every graft scan-
dal. In this, the Singapore example helps counter the argu-
ment, often heard in Taiwan, that democracy and freedom
of the press are the best watchdogs against corruption. The
idea is that without deep political reform, and through sim-
ple administrative reform, the Communist Party could do
better in its fight against endemic corruption by learning
from the Singapore experience.
Singapore shows China that the fight against corruption can
be conducted successfully by a strong state. For the party
school study group, the Singaporean system has three char-
acteristics that are applicable in China. Firstly, the Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB, tanwu diaochaju), an
institution with extensive powers. Directly answerable to the
prime minister, the CPIB can legally use an arsenal of sur-
veillance and investigative measures such as shadowing, wire
tapping, secret filming, or placing agents close to the suspect.
The only limitations on its powers stem from the empower-
ment of the interior minister to oversee its investigations and
deny it the right to file charges. Secondly, a system of civil
servants with integrity, gained through high salaries that are
paid not to encourage integrity but rather to enable the state
to select people of quality (qiangxian). Finally, Singapore
relies on an effective public communication system to educate
its people and civil servants regarding the risks entailed in
corruption. Applied in China, these methods could succeed
without causing an upheaval, like a fine shower that humidi-
fies noiselessly (xiyu run wusheng ). •
• Translated by N. Jayaram

















xiyu run wusheng 細雨潤無聲
